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A commentary on
Pride, Shame, and Group Identification
by Salice, A., and Montes Sánchez, A. (2016). Front. Psychol. 7:557. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00557
In the target article, Alessandro Salice and Alba Montes Sánchez argue that people sometimes feel
proud and ashamed of the actions of others whom they perceive to belong to the same group as
themselves. The authors maintain that the social self is the target of emotion whereas the other is
merely its focus—a background object that makes intelligible the target’s instantiating the formal
object of the emotion type.
We accept the authors’ phenomenological analysis of the intentional structure of hetero-induced
shame and pride. Instead, we raise a question about the appropriateness of these emotions that the
authors address only briefly by claiming that hetero-induced pride and shame are appropriate in
some cases, without specifying what these cases might be. Conventional emotion norms provide
one guideline, but they are not consistent. For instance, parents’ and grandparents’ pride in the
success of their offspring is a warranted emotion in American family ideology, perhaps elsewhere
in the world as well. Yet children’s shame of the drunken or criminal behavior of their parents is
regarded as an inappropriate emotion from which children should emancipate themselves. These
examples show that we need a more systematic approach to the appropriateness of hetero-induced
pride and shame.
An important distinction in appropriateness concerns the shape and size of an emotion (D’Arms
and Jacobson, 2000). An emotion is appropriate in terms of shape if its particular object has
properties that render it an instance of the formal object of the emotion type, whereas it is
appropriate in terms of size when the emotional response is neither too intense nor too mild, both
in feeling and display. But how to cash out these criteria for hetero-induced pride and shame?
Richard Lazarus defines the formal object or core relational theme of pride as “enhancement
of one’s ego-identity by taking credit of a valued object or achievement, either of our own or that
of someone or group with whom we identify” (Lazarus, 1991, 122). Interestingly, this definition
already involves the case of hetero-induced pride, unlike shame that according to Lazarus is felt
about failure to live up to one’s ego-ideal. Yet we believe that it is possible to give appropriateness
conditions for both hetero-induced pride and shame.
In group contexts, it is one thing to celebrate the achievement of one’s fellow group members,
thereby expressing one’s membership, and another thing to feel proud of oneself by virtue of such
achievement. The former does not imply the latter, and even if people use such expressions as “I
am proud of what you did,” they are not typically taking credit of the actions of others and feeling
proud of themselves, but rather praising those others and their actions (Sullivan, 2007). In some
group contexts where people feel proud of the achievements of others, the emotion can be felt as
sharing in our pride of something that we did together. Here the self is involved in the “we” that is
collectively committed to achieving its goal, and thereby every group member can take credit and
feel proud of the joint achievement.
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Still, the question remains how to apply this account to
friends and families that cannot be understood as we-mode
groups (Tuomela, 2013) in a straightforward sense. Nor is
there an experience of sharing in our pride when for instance
parents feel proud of themselves by virtue of their daughter’s
achievement.
One consideration here is to what extent hetero-induced pride
and shame are empathic responses to the emotions of others.
We readily empathize with our significant others and share the
emotions that we perceive or imagine them feeling. However,
empathically shared emotions should not be interpreted as
hetero-induced emotions of my social self in the first place.
Second, causal contribution to the success or failure of the
other may be important for the appropriateness of hetero-
induced pride and shame even if it does not figure in the
phenomenology of these emotions. The example of proud
parents is a case in point. It may be appropriate in terms of
shape only in cases where the parents with their caring and loving
parenting have contributed to the success of their offspring.
Accordingly, foster parents can feel appropriately proud of the
success of their adopted children, whereas there is something
repulsive in the pride of biological parents for the achievements
of children who have been taken into custody and raised by others
because of the parents’ neglectful or abusive behavior. We can
see some appropriateness in the pride of such parents if they
regret their early abuse, yet not as much as in the pride of proper
biological or foster parents.
Finally, there is the dimension of size in appropriateness. This
is a problem with parents and grandparents who boast about
the achievements of their offspring as this kind of flamboyant
expression betrays inappropriate intensity of the emotion. Such
parents or grandparents use their offspring as assets in social
rivalry, which is morally repulsive because human beings should
not be treated as means but as ends in themselves, to use Kant’s
expression. In general, subjects of hetero-induced pride or shame
should tone down the intensity of their emotion, recognizing the
origin of the emotion in the actions of others who are justified to
express the emotion more intensely.
The last point is salient in the case of parents and grandparents
who feel proud of the achievements of their offspring. However,
it is less salient in the case of fans who celebrate the success of
their favorite team in spectator stands or public viewing areas
where shared emotions also serve the purpose of reinforcing
the participants’ collective identity and mutual solidarity. In
such situations, ritualistic sharing of emotions intensifies them
into collective effervescence as Durkheim (1912/2001) already
observed. The fact that other factors and motives influence
emotion experience and expression in collective contexts renders
those situations more complicated than the case of parents.
Indeed, shared group-based pride should not be conceptualized
as hetero-induced personal pride.
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